3 Commits (53f87f51e3b71b6f4db5ca8733a4f7e415fe339e)

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Strycher	1f128174b7	feat(#330): pin Flutter and pass GIPHY_API_KEY in the signed build ... Rebased onto dev after #331 landed. Brings the signing workflow in line with the rest of the matrix: - Pinned to Flutter 3.44.1, matching the bench and every other workflow. A release artifact in particular must not be built by whatever `stable` happens to point at that day, which was the whole argument for #331. - Generates dart_defines.json and passes --dart-define-from-file, so the signed release does not ship with a dead GIF picker. - Cleanup step now removes dart_defines.json alongside the keystore material, since it holds the Giphy key. Verified that a job pinned to an environment still receives repository secrets (precedence is org < repo < environment, environment winning on a name collision), so the repo-scoped GIPHY_API_KEY reaches this job while the keystore secrets stay environment-scoped behind the reviewer gate. Part of epic #312, plan #321 (Phase 5).	3 days ago
Strycher	29ca744667	feat(#330): pin the expected signing certificate SHA-256 ... Rejecting only CN=Android Debug catches the #111 fallback but not a DIFFERENT key being substituted, which breaks cross-channel updates against Play just as badly. Now asserts the exact fingerprint. Established from artifacts users have already installed, with no access to the keystore password (reading a certificate off a signed APK needs none): release b55 (2026-07-06) e7da8cd5... release b58 (2026-07-10) e7da8cd5... local release build e7da8cd5... Three independent sources agree, and the owner confirmed the same strycher-personal.jks is enrolled for Play App Signing, so this is the fingerprint that must hold for a GitHub download to update over a Play install. Found while establishing it: published release b59 (2026-07-20) is DEBUG-SIGNED (765fb469, CN=Android Debug), unlike b55 and b58. That is #111 occurring in production. Filed separately. Part of epic #312, plan #321 (Phase 5).	3 days ago
Strycher	8d60b00b1b	feat(#330): release-signed APK + AAB behind an approval-gated environment ... CI has only ever produced debug-signed Android artifacts, because build.gradle.kts:63-70 falls back to signingConfigs "debug" when key.properties is absent, which is exactly the CI condition (#111). Debug-signed builds cannot be installed over a Play install or over a properly signed GitHub release, so users hit "App not installed". Adds a separate workflow that signs with the real keystore. Security posture, given this repo is PUBLIC and the keystore is the one credential that cannot be replaced if leaked: - No pull_request trigger. A PR, including from a fork, must never run a job that can read these secrets. - Pinned to the release-signing Environment, which carries a required reviewer and only accepts main or v* tags. The signing secrets are scoped to that environment, NOT to the repo, so a workflow that omits the environment key cannot read them at all. - Keystore decoded to disk only for the build, removed in a step with if: always() so a failed build leaves nothing behind. - Secrets passed via env: and printf'd into a file, never placed on a command line where they would appear in process listings, and never echoed. Includes an apksigner check that fails the job if the built APK carries CN=Android Debug. A green build alone does not prove release signing, because the gradle fallback is silent; that check is what makes this verifiable rather than assumed. The keystore is PKCS12 despite its .jks extension, and PKCS12 cannot carry a key password distinct from the store password, so one secret correctly populates both fields. Part of epic #312, plan #321 (Phase 5).	3 days ago