Children of #471 (parent stays open for AAB hardware validation, #507).
The block list was one global unscoped list on the phone, unioned onto
every radio on connect. A stale block for one of the owner's own radios
therefore rode onto every fresh/erased radio, and clearing a radio never
stuck: any other radio still holding it re-seeded the global list on
connect, which re-pushed it back.
- #505 block_store.dart: scope keys/names by connected device key (like
the app's other stores); dropLegacyGlobal() deletes the legacy
block_keys_v1/block_names_v1 (drop-and-start-fresh, owner-approved).
No global list.
- #505 block_service.dart: load() drops the legacy global and starts
empty; loadForDevice(deviceKey) swaps the in-memory set per radio and
runs the #250 self-heal. All mutating ops serialized through a Future
chain so loadForDevice and importKeys (different connector frame
handlers, both unawaited) cannot interleave and wipe each other.
- #506 meshcore_connector.dart: the device-key hook loads the connected
radio's list, so the offload union reconciles within that one radio.
Existing radio-side firmware blocks left untouched (no auto-CLEAR on
migration, owner-approved). Tests: per-radio isolation, clear-sticks
across reconnect, legacy-drop, disconnect-clears, load/import race.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A transient upstream 503 (e.g. Hugging Face) hard-failed the model download and
surfaced it as an error (#229). The download requests (HEAD, single GET, range
GET) now go through sendModelDownloadWithRetry: 5xx/429 responses and network
exceptions retry with bounded exponential backoff (1..30s, <=5 attempts, honors
Retry-After, cancellable); terminal 4xx (e.g. 404) fail immediately. The retry
logic is a pure injectable top-level function, unit-tested (503-then-200,
persistent-503, 404-no-retry, network-exception, cancel).
Manual retry after a sustained failure is the existing "Download model" button
(re-invokes the download); no new UI added. Build of epic #422.
Switching radios showed the previous radio's channel history (including
its outgoing messages) on the new radio. The in-memory caches
_channelMessages, _conversations, and _loadedConversationKeys are keyed
by channel index / contact key, not by radio, and were never cleared on
a switch; a new radio's empty store could not overwrite them
(_loadChannelMessages only writes on a non-empty read). On-disk stores
are already per-radio (device+PSK since #277), so no re-keying or
migration is needed.
Clear the three caches in _resetConnectionHandshakeState (runs at the
start of every connect). loadAllChannelMessages and _loadMessagesForContact
repopulate from the new radio's store. Adds a regression test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Client UI for the button-action matrix (#474) and the device notification
scope (#475), under Settings > Node Settings.
Speaks the canonical 0xC5 contract published by firmware in
OffbandConfigProtocol.h: one command byte, sub-code selects the surface
(0x01/0x02 scope get/set, 0x03/0x04 matrix get/set, 0x7F error). Not
folded into 0xC0, which is observer-only and would make the feature
unreachable on the headless trackers it exists for.
- Notification scope All/Self/None, labelled as this radio's buzzer and
kept distinct from the per-channel app notify mode. Re-read on open and
on every device-info refresh so a scope changed by triple-pressing the
device is never shown stale.
- Button actions per press sequence, assignable only from the action set
the DEVICE reports via its supported-actions mask, so a board with no
buzzer or no GPS never offers a choice it would refuse. Single press
defaults to unassigned.
- Long press is deliberately not assignable. Firmware owns it for CLI
rescue and power off, and remapping it could leave a screenless board
unrecoverable.
- Failures show the device's own reason via the firmware-owned reason
codes, not a generic error, and the banner persists until dismissed.
An unrecognised reason is surfaced with its raw code rather than
swallowed.
- State only ever follows the device's reply, never the request, so the
UI can never show an assignment the radio rejected and nothing is
faked or stored unacknowledged.
- A radio advertising neither capability bit gets a diagnosis, its raw
caps byte 2 and an explicit statement that no command will be sent,
rather than a blank screen that is indistinguishable from a bug.
caps2 bit assignment is firmware-confirmed: 0x01 notification scope, set
only where PIN_BUZZER is defined, 0x02 button matrix. That is the reverse
of the order the epics were filed in, so it cannot be inferred from issue
numbers.
21 protocol tests: gating, frame encoding, a lying count byte, unknown
sequence/action/scope codes, truncated and foreign frames, reason-code
mapping, and that no sequence models a long press.
NOT YET EXERCISED AGAINST A DEVICE. The firmware 0xC5 handler is written
but unmerged, so until it answers, a read shows its loading row and a
write is not confirmed. Hardware validation of the pair is the owner's
gate and has not happened.
Full suite 740 pass, analyze clean, format clean.
Epic: #474, #475
Agent: CalmBay (session d14220d9)
Two defects the adversarial review found, both verified before accepting.
1. `label` trimmed the name for display while the token stayed raw, so
two contacts differing only by surrounding whitespace rendered as
identical rows with no way to tell which one was about to be
addressed. That hides the exact identity #497 exists to preserve.
Display now defaults to the raw name.
2. Candidate deduplication used String.toLowerCase() while matching uses
the ASCII fold. Verified empirically: 'É' and 'é' compare equal under
toLowerCase and unequal under foldAscii, so of two real contacts one
silently vanished from the mention list while remaining matchable.
foldAscii is now public and is the single equivalence rule used for
both dedup and matching.
Regression tests added for both.
Full suite 719 pass, analyze clean, format clean.
Agent: CalmBay (session d14220d9)
Adds parseOffbandCaps2 alongside the existing tail-byte helpers, a
_offbandCaps2 field plus getter, and byte 2 in the device-info
capability log line.
Byte 2 sits at offset 84, deliberately NOT adjacent to byte 1 at 82:
offset 83 is already the FEM LNA state byte and every tail field is read
at a fixed absolute offset, so an adjacent insert would shift the FEM
state and make shipped clients misread a bitmask as the LNA toggle.
Firmware appends it at the end of the frame for that reason.
Absence is "no byte-2 capabilities", never an error, so any radio
predating the firmware change reads null and behaves unchanged.
No bit constants yet: byte-2 bits 0 and 1 are earmarked for firmware
epics but neither is claimed, so nothing gates on them here.
Wire contract from OffbandMesh/meshcore-firmware PR #515 (branch
feat/508-caps-byte2, commit 7664c29f). That PR is open pending this
client-side validation, tracked at #481.
Epic: #474
Agent: CalmBay (session d14220d9)
Owner ruling 2026-08-01. Mention autocomplete trimmed the contact name
when building the @[...] token while the device stores and matches it
byte-for-byte, so any name with leading or trailing whitespace was
unmentionable and never beeped. Confirmed on the wire: the contact
record keeps the 0x20, the outgoing mention drops it.
@[...] is a wire token, not display text. Entry, firmware memcpy,
advert encode, advert parse and the contact record are all verbatim by
design; this trim was the only transformation applied to a node name
anywhere, and it changed the identity of the addressee.
- MentionCandidate now separates the two concerns: `name` is raw and
goes on the wire, `label` is display-only and may be tidied. The
const constructor is preserved, so existing const call sites still
compile.
- The candidate builder keeps sender and contact names raw. Emptiness is
probed on a trimmed copy; the stored value is untouched.
- _mentionsSelf drops its own trim as a direct consequence: a raw token
requires a raw comparison, or this node stops recognising mentions of
its own name.
- Contract clause written at both the insertion site and _mentionsSelf,
stating the token is byte-for-byte and that a future .trim() tidy-up
is forbidden. The contract was silent on raw vs normalised, which is
why both sides were reasonable and incompatible.
Deliberately out of scope per the ruling: no entry-side trim in
settings_screen. It fixes no deployed name and would silently alter
deliberate spacing.
Test updated to assert the new truth: ' Ben ' does NOT match @[Ben],
and DOES match @[ Ben ]. Full suite 732 pass, analyze clean.
Agent: CalmBay (session d14220d9)
_mentionsSelf folded with String.toLowerCase(), which applies full
Unicode case mapping. Firmware adopts this same match rule with a
byte-wise fold that does not, so a node name carrying any non-ASCII
character could produce one self-mention verdict on the client and the
opposite on the device for the same message. A silent wrong answer, not
a visible failure.
Owner decision 2026-07-31: both sides fold ASCII A-Z only, so non-ASCII
names compare case-sensitively.
Extracts the rule into a testable static (mentionsName) and documents it
as a cross-repo contract: widening it, whether by accepting a bare
@name, restoring Unicode folding, or anchoring the match, is a breaking
change that ships only in an aligned client and firmware build pair.
Behaviour change: notifications for non-ASCII node names go from
case-insensitive to case-sensitive. Deliberate, per the decision above.
Epic: #475
Agent: CalmBay (session d14220d9)
resolvePathSelection returned no width and, on the override branch, a byte
count in place of a hop count. preparePathForContactSend then called
setContactPath without a width, so encodePathLen packed mode bits 00 and a
2-byte route went out as twice as many 1-byte hops (path_len 0x06 for a
6-hop 2-byte route instead of 0x46). The radio routed on wrong 1-byte
prefixes, confirmed on Bandit's 2026-08-01 log and via CoreScope. Direct
and flood were immune because neither uses the path bytes.
PathSelection now carries hashWidth and a true hop count on every branch,
using the contact's pathHashWidth as the single width authority. Both
setContactPath call sites thread it. Also addresses the override timeout
inflation half of #299 (hopCount was a byte count feeding calculateTimeout).
Gemini review found two override/history width edge cases -> split to #494.
Refs #299
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Follow-up to #457. Swept the em-dash character (U+2014) out of the test
tree (test descriptions and comments) and cleaned 8 em-dashes that
landed in lib comments via the #456 refactor after #457 merged, so the
tree is back to zero. Same rules: replaced with commas/colons/periods,
preserved the lone "no data" glyph placeholders, left non-English ARB
untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Profile is now a container of capability-scoped sections (schema_version 2):
- wifi (WifiConfig) — any wifi device
- mqtt (MqttSection = region + status_interval + brokers) — observer capability
so MQTT is defined once and shared by observer / observer-repeater /
observer-companion, never redone per device. Future radio/repeater/companion/
display sections slot in alongside.
Parser reads the sectioned YAML and rejects the old flat v1 layout with a clear
message. Enumerator reads from sections but emits the SAME firmware keys, so
apply/diff/screens are unchanged. 45 config-profile tests updated + green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ben's style rule: no em-dash character in copy, docs, or code comments
(it reads as an AI tell), and the repo is going public. Replaced the
em-dashes in code comments and English UI strings with commas, colons,
or periods, whichever reads best. User-facing strings were hand-tuned
for natural punctuation rather than a blanket comma.
Preserved the lone "no data" glyph placeholders (a standalone dash used
as a not-available indicator in status displays); those are a design
element, not prose.
Regenerated app_localizations*.dart from app_en.arb (the English
fallback for untranslated keys propagates to every locale's generated
file). Non-English ARB translations left untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Firmware #465 now writes RX RSSI into reserved2 (byte[3]) of the v3
contact-msg-recv frame as a clamped int8 dBm, 0 when unset
(MyMesh.cpp:550-551). Read it in the parse instead of skipping: gate on
!= 0 (RSSI is always negative for a real RX, so 0 = no data), null for
device-composed outgoing messages.
reserved1 (byte[2]) is untouched — that's #429's outgoing flag; RSSI
lives in byte[3] after the res1/res2 collision fix (#464/#465).
The Message.rssi field, persistence, param-passing, and the (hidden-
while-null) RSSI row on the Packet Path screen were all staged in #438,
so this is just the wire read + 3 gate tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Smaz is a client-side text convention with no MeshCore protocol or firmware
support (findings: GH-315). When enabled it compressed ordinary prose into
`s:`+base64, which any non-lineage client renders as garbage — the same
cross-client interop failure as the old `g:<code>` GIF token.
Phase 1 of the Smaz-removal epic (GH-314): stop sending Smaz and remove the
user-facing surface, while KEEPING decode so messages from lineage peers still
on Smaz, and any legacy compressed rows, keep rendering. Decode removal is
deferred to Phase 2 (GH-421).
Removed: the Smaz branch in prepareContact/ChannelOutboundText (Cyr2Lat branch
and the structured-payload guard preserved); connector state/API (the enabled
maps, is*/set*SmazEnabled, ensureContactSmazSettingLoaded, the warm-up and
channel loaders); the per-channel and per-contact toggles plus their
mutual-exclusion; loadSmazEnabled/saveSmazEnabled and the `*_smaz_` key prefixes
(stores kept, they also hold Cyr2Lat); l10n `channels_smazCompression` and the
orphaned `chat_compressOutgoingMessages` across 18 locales (+ regenerated
app_localizations).
Retained for Phase 2: the 5 Smaz.tryDecodePrefixed decode sites and
helpers/smaz.dart.
Safety (verified): no storage migration, the app already persists plaintext
(receive decodes before store; send stores the pre-compression text), so the
`s:` form was wire-only. ACK matching is unaffected, the expected hash derives
from prepare*'s output, so dropping compression keeps both sides hashing
plaintext.
Behavior change: the composer byte-counter now reflects raw size, so anyone who
had Smaz on can type slightly fewer chars per message.
Tests: gif_url_outbound_guard_test rewritten to pin plaintext passthrough and
decode retention. Full suite green, analyze clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- config_profile_diff.dart: pure current->new diff builder (add/change,
drops no-ops, flags danger + secret rows). 4 tests.
- splitProfileWrites: partitions writes into safe vs credential/identity for
the two-tier apply; a mixed broker splits, enabled rides the safe half only.
- ConfigProfilePreviewScreen: full sub-screen — reads current state, renders
the diff (amber overwrites, red danger section), normal Apply for plain
config + a separate red gate (with confirm dialog listing exactly which
credential/identity values change) for the danger set. Secrets masked.
Re-diffs after apply for partial-save recovery.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Device-agnostic write enumerator (config_profile_writes.dart): a profile ->
ordered flat writes + per-broker field maps. Skips null/empty (never clobbers),
skips jwt_token (live-minted), holds enabled out for last-write, flags the
danger set (username/password/jwt_owner/jwt_email + wifi.pwd) for #406's gate.
Observer executor (observer_apply_service.dart): flats via setFlat, brokers via
the existing saveBroker (disable-first, fields, enabled LAST, stop-on-error
partial-safe #80); reads current enabled to preserve it when a profile omits it.
Result labels name keys/slots only, never values (no secret leak).
8 enumerator tests. Executor is thin orchestration over the tested service;
end-to-end covered by #408 hardware.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Tapping a DM opens the Path screen; it now shows the RF details the app
was already receiving but discarding:
- SNR: captured from the v3 contact-msg-recv frame (was skipBytes(1)).
Firmware sends (int8)(snr_dB*4), so dB = byte/4.0 (MyMesh.cpp:512) —
the old commented-out code multiplied by 4, which was 16x wrong.
- Path type: firmware sends path_len 0xFF for a direct/routed frame and
the hop count for a flood (MyMesh.cpp:545). The app collapsed 0xFF->0,
colliding "direct" with "flood, 0 hops". Capture the distinction into
Message.isFloodRoute so the Path row reads "direct (routed)" vs
"flood, N hops".
- RSSI: row wired to Message.rssi but left null — the wire byte is a
hardcoded reserved 0 today; populated once firmware ships it (#439).
Message gains snr/rssi/isFloodRoute (nullable, additive, persisted like
rxTime). 10 tests cover scaling, the 0xFF discriminator, and copyWith.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A max-length DM built a 170-byte frame but this BLE link only writes
ATT_MTU-3 (=169) bytes, so writeCharacteristic threw. The DM path swallowed
the throw and never resolved the message, leaving it "active" forever and
silently blocking every later DM to that contact until force-stop+reconnect.
- Size: maxContact/ChannelMessageBytes take an MTU-aware frame budget
(BLE = mtuNow-3, USB/TCP = maxFrameSize); composers pass
connector.effectiveMaxFrameSize. The channel cap now also subtracts the
"Name: " prefix so a small-MTU link can't overflow.
- DM wedge: _sendMessageDirect propagates the failure and the retry callback
is awaited, so a failed send marks the message failed and drains the
per-contact queue. Added a RESP_CODE_SENT safety timeout.
- Channel wedge: sendChannelMessage clears the stuck queue id and marks the
message failed on a failed write.
- Tests: MTU-aware caps + failed-send-does-not-wedge regression.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The 172->176 ceiling raise made the existing "drops oversized frames and
resyncs" test's 173-byte frame a valid length, so it buffered instead of
dropping (it was red). Derive the over-max length from the ceiling so it stays
a genuine oversized frame and still exercises drop-and-resync, confirming the
higher ceiling doesn't weaken corrupt-frame recovery. Full suite: 643 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The frame decoder capped companion frames at 172, but the firmware's real
MAX_FRAME_SIZE is 176 (BaseSerialInterface.h, "+4 for transport codes").
Full-size caplog CHUNK frames (176 B) were silently rejected; only the final
sub-172 partial chunk survived, so a download reassembled just the last chunk
(e.g. "received 95 of 5141"). Caplog is the first feature to use full frames,
so nothing exposed this before.
- usb_serial_frame_codec.dart: usbSerialMaxPayloadLength 172 -> 176.
- serial_capture_screen.dart: erase-on-start (Start / Start&Reboot) for a clean
session ("didn't start at 0").
- 3 decoder regression tests; 113 tests total green; analyze clean.
Root cause confirmed with firmware (TopazHill): firmware streams the full
buffer correctly (wire trace 5175/5175); the client decoder dropped oversized
chunks. My earlier firmware-ring hypothesis was wrong.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes the reboot-test failure (support latched "unsupported" after the
reconnect window) and reworks the boot-log UX per Ben.
- meshcore_protocol.dart: offbandCapCaplog (0x20) + firmwareSupportsOffbandCaplog
(0x20 bit AND FIRMWARE_VER_CODE >= 17), mirroring the block-cap pattern.
- meshcore_connector.dart: supportsOffbandCaplog getter.
- serial_capture_screen.dart: gate support on the static cap bit (reactive via
the connector), not a one-shot STATUS probe, so it never latches "unsupported"
after a reboot. Derive capturing state from device STATUS so an auto-resumed
capture (post firmware #428) shows STOP not START. Cancel timers on disconnect,
re-query STATUS on reconnect. New red "Start & Reboot" (no timer) boot-log flow.
- 4 cap-gate unit tests; 18 caplog tests total green; analyze clean.
Root cause confirmed with firmware (TopazHill): caplog cap bit (0x20) is
advertised statically across reboots; the client's probe raced the reconnect
window and latched. Firmware #428 (persist flag + boot capture) is the other half.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Extends the 0xC4 caplog protocol with the companion control sub-codes the
firmware exposes (the companion has no CLI; #395 CLI verbs are repeater-
only). Firmware #417/#408.
- meshcore_protocol.dart: request sub-codes ENABLE/DISABLE/ERASE/STATUS +
builders; ACK / STATUS parsers (CaplogAck, CaplogDeviceStatus).
- meshcore_connector.dart: setDeviceCaplogEnabled / eraseDeviceCaplog /
getDeviceCaplogStatus; 0xC4 response routing split so ACK (0x10) and
STATUS (0x11) dispatch to own completers, download stream unchanged.
- 5 unit tests for builders + parsers; analyze clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Slice 1 of the client half of serial-capture (#430): the protocol layer
to download the device's serial-capture buffer over the companion link.
- meshcore_protocol.dart: cmdOffbandCaplog / respCodeOffbandCaplog = 0xC4
(NOT 0xC3, which collides with cmdOffbandFemLna; see firmware #406),
START/CHUNK/END sub-codes + request builder.
- caplog_reassembler.dart: pure START/CHUNK*/END reassembly state machine
with truncation detection, unit-tested in isolation.
- meshcore_connector.dart: downloadCaplog() + 0xC4 frame dispatch + fast
busy-reject on RESP_CODE_ERR while awaiting START.
- 9 unit tests passing; flutter analyze clean.
Integration test gated on the firmware 0xC4 fix merging. Not pushed
(human-test gate).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Address 3 review findings (all confirmed real): thread section context through
the optional-field accessors so nested errors name the broker (brokers[i]."port"),
reject broker ports outside 1..65535, and reject negative integer fields
(status_interval, jwt_refresh) via a shared _optUint. +3 tests (14 total).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the yaml dependency and parseConfigProfile(): YAML -> ConfigProfile
(#402). Strict by design since profiles are untrusted input (#139) — unknown
keys, wrong types, out-of-range/duplicate broker slots, and unknown
transport/auth values all throw ConfigProfileFormatException with a
user-facing message. Only keys present populate the model. 11 unit tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Wadamesh keys its history watermark (last_delivered_seq) by client_id. We
sent none, so we shared the empty-string slot with every other MeshCore
client on the machine: whichever connected first drained the device history
ring and the next app got NO_MORE_MESSAGES for frames it never received.
cid_len is 6 by necessity, not preference. Stock reads cmd_frame[1..7] as
reserved with the app name at a fixed offset 8; Wadamesh reads the name at
2 + cid_len. Only 6 puts the name at 8 on both, so one frame serves both
firmwares with no firmware change. Covered by app_start_frame_test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Reactions stored only a Map<String,int> of emoji to count, so "who
reacted" was unanswerable and MeshCore One's tap-to-see-who had nothing
to show against. This captures the reactor for every reaction, both our
own r: format and the PocketMesh / MeshCore One format.
Data layer only. The tap-a-badge-to-see-who UI is a separate follow-on;
this makes the data available and does not change any screen.
Additive by design. A new reactionSenders field (Map<String,List<String>>,
emoji -> reactor names) sits alongside the existing count map, serialised
under a new JSON key. Both maps are always written. An older build reading
a newer store ignores the unknown key and still gets correct counts from
reactions; it never hits the hard `value as int` cast that would fail the
whole message-list load (the #355 data-loss shape). Records written before
this field load with an empty sender map, so their counts survive with
names simply absent.
- ChannelMessage + Message: new reactionSenders field, constructor,
copyWith
- both stores: serialise the new key; deserialise via a shared
ReactionHelper.reactionSendersFromJson that returns empty for a missing
key and skips malformed entries rather than throwing
- applyReaction: records the reactor and dedups per reactor per emoji.
This is persistent dedup (survives restart), unlike the connector's
in-memory processed-set. A pre-existing count with no sender list is
incremented from its stored value, not recomputed from the partial
list, so old counts are preserved.
- connector: threads the reactor name into all reaction paths. Channel
uses the frame sender; a room resolves the author via
fourByteRoomContactKey; an outgoing reaction is attributed to self.
- pending queue: retry now hands the stored reactor to its callback
Tests: reactor capture, two-reactor count, same-reactor no-double-count,
pre-#383 count preservation, and JSON round-trip + backward-compat +
malformed-entry handling for the new field. Full suite 604 passing.
Epic #376.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two of three Gemini findings held up against the code; the third did not.
Accepted, message-swallow risk: the emoji check looked only at the first
rune against a range list that included arrows, so a multi-line message
beginning with an arrow and ending in eight Crockford characters would
have been consumed and displayed as a reaction whose "emoji" was the
whole sentence. Ben's own capture has U+2192 mid-sentence in ordinary
channel traffic, so this was reachable, not theoretical.
- drop U+2190-U+21FF and U+2934-U+2935; arrows carry the Unicode Emoji
property but read as punctuation in prose
- cap the emoji segment at 8 runes, which is clear of the longest ZWJ
sequence and nowhere near a sentence. This is the guard that holds
regardless of how the range list evolves.
Accepted, dedup: the contact path keyed on target hash plus emoji only.
A room server is many-party over the 1:1 transport, so two members
sending the same emoji collapsed into one and the count stuck at 1, the
same defect already fixed on the channel path. The reacting author
prefix is now part of the key; in a true 1:1 it is empty and the key is
unchanged.
Rejected, room-server sender matching: the review claimed getSenderName
resolves to the room itself and that room text carries a "Sender: "
prefix. Neither is true. _resolveContactSenderName resolves the author
via fourByteRoomContactKey to the real per-sender contact name, and room
message text is stored bare with the author in its own field. One real
sub-case survives: an author who is not in our contacts resolves to null
and will not match, which degrades to queue-then-expire with a warn log.
Also rejected: switching @[ lookup from first to last occurrence. The
reference implementation uses the first, and diverging risks mismatching
payloads it accepts.
Reactions sent from MeshCore One arrived as junk text: an emoji line
followed by an 8-character token such as "dyps6yf0". Those tokens are
Crockford Base32 target-message hashes, the second line of a two-line
reaction payload we did not recognise.
Receive-side only. Offband keeps sending its own r:hhhh:ii format; their
client already parses ours, so nothing about what we transmit changes.
Wire format (confirmed against a live capture, see #378):
channel: {emoji}@[{targetSender}]\n{hash}
direct: {emoji}\n{hash}
hash: sha256(body utf8 + timestamp uint32 LE seconds)[0:5],
Crockford Base32, 8 chars, lowercase
The body is hashed without the channel "SenderName: " prefix, which is
why the sender travels in @[...] instead.
- crockford_base32.dart: encode and normalise, 12-bit accumulator so the
web target's 32-bit bitwise ops cannot truncate a 40-bit value
- pocketmesh_reaction.dart: hash and a parser mirroring the reference
implementation, with a conservative leading-emoji check so a real
message is never swallowed
- reaction_helper.dart: ReactionInfo carries a dialect; applyReaction
picks the matching hash and, for the channel form, requires an exact
sender-name match (a node name can carry emoji and variation
selectors)
- pending_reactions.dart: a reaction arriving before its target is held
and retried rather than silently dropped, bounded at 50 entries with a
15 minute TTL and a warn-level log on expiry (closes the silent-drop
path in #382)
- the channel dedup key now includes the reacting sender, so two people
sending the same emoji no longer collapse into one
- notification tray summarises the foreign format as a reaction instead
of showing the raw token
Known limitation: on channels with Smaz or Cyr2Lat enabled the wire text
differs from the text we store, so a hash computed by another client
will not match. Flagged for a decision rather than worked around.
Epic #376. Fast-follow #383 adds reactor identity.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
AppShell decided top-level vs detail by `selectedIndex != null`, but pushed
detail screens (a channel chat, the LOS map) also set selectedIndex to keep the
bottom bar visible. So Back from inside a channel backgrounded/left the app
instead of popping to the channel list.
Decouple the two concerns: add `isTopLevel` (default true), separate from
`selectedIndex`. Detail screens pass `isTopLevel: false` (keep the bar, but Back
pops). The decision is extracted into a pure `AppShell.backAction`
(drawer -> close; detail with a route below -> pop; else -> background), with an
assert that a detail is actually poppable. Unit tests cover the matrix; widget
tests exercise the real system-Back -> PopScope -> pop wiring.
Follow-up #390 tracks the separate AppBar back-arrow path.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
When the database can't open (e.g. the native sqlite library fails to load),
every read/write silently failed and the app opened to an empty, normal-looking
screen — the user thinks their history was wiped (SAFELANE §6 violation).
Probe the storage layer in main() before any store reads
(BlobStore.verifyReadWrite). On failure, a StorageHealthService one-way latch
records it, and a persistent, non-dismissable banner is shown above the whole
app: history is not lost, storage is unavailable, messages are NOT being saved,
restart after fixing. Cross-platform (probe goes through drift, covers web too).
Tests: service state/latch + banner show/hide widget test. Gemini-reviewed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
#363 pins the DB to one directory and migrates ONE prior store in, but a user
who ran differently-built copies can have data split across several stores.
On startup (native only, after the prefs->drift migration) this discovers
every store on the machine and unions its bulk blobs (messages by id, contacts
by public key) into the current one, so nothing shows as a gap. Sources are
read-only and never deleted.
Not a one-shot: instead of a permanent flag it tracks each store's signature
(mtime+size), so a store that a stray older build later creates or grows is
re-merged rather than stranded. A store over a 200 MB guard, or one that
cannot be read, is skipped and NOT recorded as done, so it retries later.
Identity dedup is key-order independent. sqlite3 (dart:ffi) stays out of the
web build via a conditional import.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The DB directory came from getApplicationSupportDirectory(), which on Windows
is derived from the executable's Company/Product version metadata. Two builds
with different metadata (or a future rebrand) resolved DIFFERENT %APPDATA%
folders and read DIFFERENT databases, so a user's history appeared to vanish
when they ran a different build.
Pin the desktop DB to a constant path (Windows: %APPDATA%\Offband MeshCore;
Linux pinned too, its support dir derives from the exe name). On first run at
the pinned location, migrate an existing DB in via SQLite VACUUM INTO (a
consistent snapshot that is safe even under a concurrent writer), choosing the
DB from the known canonical locations first and falling back to a bounded
scan of the app-data roots (no name blocklist) so a DB under an unknown
folder is still found. On any snapshot failure it aborts cleanly, leaving the
source intact and opening a fresh DB - never a raw file copy of a live WAL DB.
Adds sqlite3 as a direct dependency (pinned to drift 2.34.2's resolved 3.5.0).
Tests cover source selection, the folder-agnostic scan, and the snapshot
happy + abort paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The migration's already-present branch called prefs.remove(key) and threw
the prefs copy away when drift already held the key. A build that writes to
SharedPreferences (a non-drift build, or any in-between test build) collects
new messages there, so the next drift run silently gapped that history out.
It cost 574 real channel messages, recovered from backups.
Union the prefs copy into drift by element identity (messageId, else
publicKey, else canonical JSON), keeping drift's live copy on a collision and
appending prefs-only elements. Verify the merged write before removing the
source. New `merged` counter in the report.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adversarial review (standards#145) of the storage/migration surface found four
real defects, all data-integrity. All confirmed against the code and fixed; no
false positives.
BLOCKER - concurrent save race. saveChannelMessages / saveMessages are
read-modify-write with an await gap, so two saves to the same key raced and the
second clobbered the first, silently losing messages (e.g. a message and its
delivery ack arriving together). BlobStore now provides synchronized(key, ...),
a per-key operation chain; every RMW - merge-save, remove, and the load-path
legacy migration - runs through it. Different keys stay concurrent. New test
fires two concurrent saves and asserts the union survives.
BLOCKER - non-atomic DB relocation. The documents->support move copied and
deleted each file (.sqlite/-wal/-shm) in turn, so a failure after the main file
moved stranded the DB across two locations and corrupted it. Now copies all
files, verifies each by size, and only then deletes the sources; on any failure
it rolls back the destination and leaves the original intact.
MAJOR - load-path legacy migration raced save. The #194 index->PSK adoption did
a blind write to the PSK key that could clobber a save that landed first. It now
runs under the key lock and MERGES (union) instead of overwriting, so both the
adopted history and any fresh message survive.
MINOR - channel merge key lacked a sender. Two senders posting identical text at
the same timestamp without a messageId would collide and lose one. The key now
includes the sender, matching MessageStore.
flutter analyze clean, dart format clean, 509 tests pass. Full Gemini log in
docs/llm-consultations/.
The persisted store was being overwritten with the windowed in-memory list, so
any channel or DM with more than _messageWindowSize (200) messages lost
everything older than the newest 200 on the first save after load. Observed
live: Public went 232 -> 201 in one session on a build that already had the
#333 fix, so this was not the race - it was windowing truncating the store.
This is the slow-erosion cause behind the whole 566 -> 231 -> 206 -> 201
history.
saveChannelMessages / saveMessages now MERGE into the persisted set instead of
overwriting: upsert by message identity so older persisted messages are kept,
new ones added, and the in-memory copy wins for edits/reactions/status. If the
existing history fails to decode, the save aborts loudly rather than merging
into an empty base and truncating (SAFELANE 6).
Deletion is now an explicit path - removeChannelMessage / removeMessage - since
the app deletes individual messages. Routing delete through the merging save
would resurrect them; the connector's deleteChannelMessage / deleteMessage now
call the explicit remove.
Windowing stays for display and memory; it no longer dictates what is stored.
Tests: 250-message history survives a 200-window save; new message appends;
edit is captured not duplicated; delete does not resurrect. 508 pass, analyze
and format clean.
Cost: a save now re-reads and re-encodes the channel/contact history. Cheap
with drift's per-key writes (#335); a future append-only schema removes even
that.
The guard read pubspec.lock with a newline-sensitive regex, so it passed on
LF (CI) and failed on CRLF (Windows) for the same, correct assets. A guard
that is itself platform-fragile is worse than none. Normalise CRLF->LF before
matching.
Surfaced by the 290+306+335 integration merge, where the lockfile came through
with CRLF endings.
Moves message history, contacts and discovered contacts out of the settings
store. Settings stay in SharedPreferences, which is what it is for.
Ordering is the whole safety argument: WRITE, VERIFY BY READING BACK, and only
then remove the source. #333 was a storage path that chose a key silently and
made 566 real messages read as empty; deleting before verifying would make
that class of mistake permanent instead of cosmetic. On any failure the source
is left intact and the error is logged - never a silent drop (SAFELANE 6).
Idempotent by construction: a key already present in drift is not overwritten,
so re-running is a no-op. If an older build re-writes a migrated key into
prefs, the migrated copy wins and the stale prefs copy is discarded rather
than promoted.
Rehearsed against a COPY of a real 7 MB store, as the plan required before
touching live data:
REHEARSAL: 69 migrated, 0 failed, 5.21 MB, 69 bulk keys expected
Every key checked for exact length, confirmed removed from prefs, and every
settings key confirmed untouched. The live store was never opened.
Two things the tests caught that review would not have:
1. getString THROWS on a non-string value rather than returning null, so a
non-string under a bulk prefix was counted as a migration FAILURE. It now
type-checks with prefs.get() and skips. Alarming falsely is its own bug.
2. The `contacts` prefix was checked against the real store rather than
assumed: it matches only the 6 bulk contact blobs, and correctly does NOT
match contact_unread_count*.
Not yet wired into app startup - that is the switchover, and it is deliberately
a separate commit so this can be reviewed on its own.
flutter analyze clean, dart format clean, 504 tests pass.
Owner asked whether the web assets must be re-downloaded on every drift bump.
They do not - the version can be pinned - but doing that safely needed three
changes, because the failure mode is silent.
1. drift and drift_flutter are pinned EXACTLY (2.34.2 / 0.3.1), no caret. The
committed web assets are built for a specific drift release, so a caret
would let pub resolve a newer drift than the shipped binaries and break the
web build with no signal at compile time.
2. pubspec.lock is now committed (removed from .gitignore). It was ignored,
which for an application means resolution can differ between machines and
CI. That undermines the pin: the assets are matched against the RESOLVED
version, so resolution has to be reproducible. Owner-authorized, and it is
a repo-wide change rather than a storage-only one.
3. New test asserting the shipped assets match the resolved drift version,
plus that both files exist and the wasm really starts with the WebAssembly
magic bytes. Verified in both directions: it passes when matched and fails
loudly with re-download instructions when skewed.
Without (3) a stale asset compiles, deploys, and only fails in the user's
browser - the exact silent-failure class SAFELANE 6 forbids and that produced
#333 earlier.
Upgrading drift is now a deliberate step: bump the pin, re-download both
assets, update web/drift_assets.version. The test fails until you do.
flutter analyze clean, tests pass.
Step 1 of #335, deliberately before any data migration: prove the store works
before trusting it with message history.
Adds drift + drift_flutter, a key/value StoredBlobs table mapping 1:1 onto the
existing SharedPreferences keys, and verifyReadWrite() as a runtime probe.
Key/value rather than relational tables on purpose: it maps directly onto the
current store interfaces, so callers do not change and the migration can be
verified row-for-row against the old keys. Relational schemas come later, once
this is proven and querying is actually wanted.
Verified here:
- 3 tests pass, including a 6 MiB round-trip - larger than the 5 MiB
localStorage cap that makes the web build impossible today
- flutter analyze clean
- Windows release build succeeds
- Web release build compiles
Two findings from the gate that a plan-on-paper would have missed:
1. sqlite3_flutter_libs 0.6.0+eol is a DEPRECATED no-op. From sqlite3 v3.x it
is unnecessary and drift_flutter already covers it, so it is not a direct
dependency here.
2. The web build COMPILES BUT WOULD FAIL AT RUNTIME: drift needs sqlite3.wasm
and drift_worker.dart.js shipped in web/, and neither is present. Per drift
docs they are downloaded from GitHub releases, version-matched to
pubspec.lock (drift 2.34.2, sqlite3 3.5.0), and the server must serve .wasm
as Content-Type: application/wasm. Not done here - downloading files needs
explicit human approval.
Also noted: the drift_dev CLI does not compile at these versions
(allSchemaEntities missing from the drift3_preview GeneratedDatabase), so its
asset tooling is unavailable. build_runner code generation is unaffected.
No user data is touched. No store is switched over. The migration is the next
step and remains gated on the web assets question.
formatNotificationText used GifHelper.parseGif (Giphy only) while the chat
renders via resolveGifUrl (Giphy + allowlisted Tenor CDN). An allowlisted
Tenor GIF therefore rendered inline but still dumped a raw URL into the
notification tray.
Point both at resolveGifUrl so the tray summarises exactly the set the chat
displays. Off-allowlist URLs still pass through as plain text, pinned by test.
This is the same duplicate-detection drift that caused #284; closing it at the
source rather than shipping a known inconsistency.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Pasted GIF links rendered as plain text because parseGif only matched the
compact forms. Adds GifHelper.resolveGifUrl, which maps any supported payload
to the URL that renders it, and widens coverage to the links people actually
paste.
Allowlist is deliberately narrow, Giphy and Tenor only. Off-list URLs return
null and stay plain tap-to-open links, never auto-fetched: auto-loading a
stranger's URL leaks the viewer's IP and enables tracking-pixel abuse, and
inline-rendering unmoderated hosts is a malware and inappropriate-content
vector. Tests pin the rejections, including a lookalike host
(giphy.com.evil.example) and a general image host (imgur).
Newly rendered:
- i.giphy.com/<id>.gif and .webp, the form a browser copy produces
- media.tenor.com and c.tenor.com direct assets
A tenor.com/view/<slug>-<id> PAGE url is deliberately NOT matched. The modern
Tenor CDN path uses an opaque hash that cannot be derived from the page id, so
resolving one requires the Tenor API and a key. Such a link stays plain rather
than silently rendering the wrong image. Supporting it is a separate decision.
Also removes the hardcoded 'https://media.giphy.com/media/$gifId/giphy.gif'
literal duplicated across all four render call sites. That duplication is the
same drift that caused the #284 notification regression, where a second
hand-rolled copy of GIF detection went stale.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Notifications summarised a GIF as "Sent a GIF" using their own hand-rolled
`^g:[A-Za-z0-9_-]+$` regex rather than GifHelper. #282 changed the payload to
`https://giphy.com/gifs/<id>`, which that regex does not match, so GIF
notifications regressed to dumping the raw URL into the tray.
Detection now goes through `GifHelper.parseGif`, matching how the adjacent
reaction case already delegates to ReactionHelper. That restores the summary
and covers every form the app can send, including replies (`@[Name] ` +
payload), which the old regex never matched even for legacy `g:<id>`.
Verified no other hand-rolled `^g:`/`^m:`/`^s:`/`^r:` payload regexes remain
outside their owning helpers, so this class of drift is closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Completes the client half against the firmware as-built (#298):
- Device-info offset 83 carries the FEM LNA state on v16+, appended
unconditionally (reads 0 on non-capable boards). parseFemLnaState is
length-guarded and returns null pre-v16. Byte presence signals firmware
version, not capability — the cap BIT gates the UI.
- 0xC3 reply handler adopts the reported value verbatim: firmware returns
post-apply hardware state, not an echo, so a refused write surfaces as
truth rather than a lie.
- setFemLna / requestFemLnaState no-op unless the capability bit is set,
so a non-capable radio never sees 0xC3 traffic.
- Radio Settings toggle rendered only when the bit is set, driven by
connector state via ListenableBuilder rather than local optimistic
state, so it always shows what the radio reports.
- errCodeUnsupportedCmd documented: a mis-gated request draws [0x01][0x01],
not [0x01][0x06]. Neither is 0xC3-prefixed, so no new error path.
Gating is on the bit alone, never model or version: firmware derives it
from a runtime FEM probe, so two Heltec V4s can legitimately disagree and
rak3401 reports false by design (its SKY66122 gates LNA and PA together).
13 tests. Not hardware-validated — firmware 0xC3 is still on a branch.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the client half of the Heltec V4 FEM LNA control surface at the
protocol level: 0xC3 CMD_OFFBAND_FEM_LNA (0x01 SET [value], 0x02 GET),
a 3-byte [0xC3][sub][value] reply parser, and the
OFFBAND_CAP_FEM_LNA = 0x04 capability gate.
Deliberately a fork-private command rather than a sixth byte on the
stock CMD_SET_OTHER_PARAMS (38): that frame is shared with upstream
MeshCore and is sent to every radio regardless of fork, so widening it
would perturb stock firmware. Nothing is emitted unless the capability
bit is set.
The gate checks the bit only, never model or version — firmware derives
it at runtime from the auto-detected FEM chip, so it is a per-unit
answer and two Heltec V4s can legitimately disagree.
PROVISIONAL: firmware owns the caps byte and has not yet confirmed 0x04
is free, and the 0xC3 setter is not built yet. Spec sent to
OffbandMesh/meshcore-firmware#298. Do not merge before firmware
confirms the shape as built.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The firmware path-len byte is packed and self-describing (src/Packet.h:79-84):
high 2 bits = hash size - 1, low 6 bits = hash COUNT (hops), byte length =
count * size. The app treated the low 6 bits as a byte count and ignored the
width, on the strength of a comment asserting the high bits were "not reliably
populated". Both halves of that comment were wrong.
Receive: Contact.fromFrame read `count` bytes where firmware meant `count`
hops, so at 2-byte width it kept HALF of every path and discarded the rest.
DAYTON VA's 2-hop route became a 2-byte fragment, which is why every repeater
login in Bandit's capture timed out.
Send: buildUpdateContactPathFrame wrote the count raw, leaving mode bits 00.
That tells the radio "1-byte hashes" while handing it 2-byte hash data, so it
routed to nodes never on the route. This is the likelier cause of the observed
"routes via c6 and 5c separately" behaviour.
Also fixes a third unit inconsistency: setContactPath wrote customPath.length
(bytes) into pathLength (hops) after every path set.
Contact now carries pathHashWidth per path, so a stored path can never be
re-sliced at a width it was not captured at. realHopCount() is removed rather
than adjusted: it divided an already-correct hop count, halving it at 2-byte
width, and every call site was compensating for a bug that no longer exists.
Migration (Ben's call, option A): records written before this change have no
pathHashWidth and hold truncated bytes that cannot be recovered by
reinterpretation, so their path is dropped and the contact reverts to flood
until the radio re-supplies it. Logged, not silent.
Tests asserted the old semantics (expect(realHopCount(2, 2), 1)) and were
rewritten against firmware truth rather than adjusted to keep passing. Added
send-side encoding coverage, which did not exist. 456 tests pass.
Refs #240, #279, #299
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The picker emitted `g:<id>`, a convention that exists only in this Flutter
client lineage's parseGif (inherited from upstream, not a MeshCore protocol
feature). A recipient on stock or any non-lineage client has no way to expand
it, so a GIF arrived as opaque text (#223).
encodeGif now emits `https://giphy.com/gifs/<id>`, a form parseGif already
matches, so:
- stock clients receive a tappable URL they can actually open
- Offband keeps rendering inline with no render-side change
- legacy `g:<id>` payloads still decode, back-compat unchanged
Cost is ~41B vs ~20B against a ~160B payload. A full message carrying sender
prefix + reply mention + URL measures ~79B, roughly half the cap.
Checked, and did NOT change, the outbound structured-payload guard in
prepareContactOutboundText/prepareChannelOutboundText: Smaz.encodeIfSmaller
declines to compress a URL (base64 overhead exceeds the dictionary gain) and
Cyr2Lat passes unmapped ASCII through, so a GIF URL survives intact without
widening the guard. Both pinned as regression tests instead.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Blocking yourself silently hid your own traffic with no visible cause,
and because blocks are offloaded to the radio it was pushed there and
could be pulled back by the connect-time union.
BlockService gains a selfKeyHex, injected by the connector when the self
key is learned and cleared on disconnect. Every add path refuses it
(block, importKeys, maybePromote) — importKeys specifically, so a
self-block already on the radio cannot be re-imported. setSelfKey also
heals an existing self-block and pushes REMOVE, covering the case where
the union pull lands before self-info arrives. Contacts and discovery
sheets hide the Block option for your own node.
Per Gemini review: heal on an unchanged key too (an early return would
strand a self-block introduced after the key was known), and order
setSelfKey so all in-memory state settles synchronously, keeping callers
consistent even though the connector fires it unawaited.
Adds test/services/block_service_test.dart — the first coverage for
BlockService (10 tests).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Strycher
